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NOTES AND COMMENTS
rhe Impact of Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
on General Maritime Law
The Supreme Court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.' finally
decided one of the last remaining trouble spots to a uniform system of
maritime law-the question of recovery for a wrongful death claim in
state territorial waters. The Supreme Court overruled the previously
held controlling case of The Harrisbur? which refused to allow recovery
under general maritime law for wrongful death on navigable waters.
The Harrisburg was decided in 1886 and its decision was binding
until the new theory of recovery was espoused by the court finally in
Moragne. The Harrisburg had firmly entrenched in maritime law the
common law doctrine that "no civil action lies for an injury which results
in ... death." 3 Thus in deciding this case, the Court just implemented the
general common law into the law of the sea. Temporarily the problem
was solved by refusing to allow recovery for wrongful death in admiralty.
Moragne, a basically simple fact situation case, finally laid to rest the
injustice and inequity of The Harrisburg and of several other cases which
I will discuss later. In Moragne, plaintiff's decedent, a longshoreman, was
performing his usual duties aboard respondent's (States Marine Lines,
Inc.) ship and was killed when a beam became disengaged and struck him
in the head. The accident and subsequent death occurred because of a
faulty locking device on the beam while the ship was within the navigable
waters of the State of Florida. Decedent's wife initially filed suit against
respondent in Florida state court and based her claim on the negligence
and unseaworthiness of the ship. Because of the diversity of citizenship,
the respondent removed the case to the federal district court of Florida,
where the unseaworthiness claim was dismissed. Petitioner then sought an
interlocutory decree from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals as to the
validity of the dismissal of the unseaworthiness claim. The Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld the district court's decision based on the advice given to
it by the Florida Supreme Court which held that the Florida Wrongful
1398 U.S. 375 (1970).
2 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754 (1878). This case was decided at a time
when federal courts under Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L.Ed. 865 (1842) ex-
pounded a general federal common law.
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Death Statute4 did not incorporate substantive admiralty principles and
that a claim for unseaworthiness would not lie under this statute.5 From
here a writ of certiorari was presented to the Supreme Court which
finally reversed the earlier decisions of the lower courts and allowed pe-
titioner to recover for wrongful death under general maritime law. Thus
the Supreme Court overruled The Tungus v. Skovgaard6 and The Harris-
burg,7 to the extent that these decisions did not allow for a remedy for
wrongful death in general maritime law, unless a statute provided such a
remedy.
In reaching this new decision the Supreme Court went into the history
behind the facts and law leading up to Moragne. Prior to The Harrisburg
there had been no uniform approach to the problem of wrongful death
remedies, but once this case was decided, the court held that the common
law doctrine of no recovery would be incorporated in toto into maritime
law. Thus, no remedy was allowed for wrongful death in general maritime
law unless there was some statute, either state or federal, which granted
such a remedy.
With this one exception available to the no recovery remedy, many
states enacted statutes creating a right of a claim for wrongful death.'
The Supreme Court became cognizant of these state remedies and aware of
the states' eagerness to avoid the hard rule laid down by The Harrisburg.
Consequently, the various state death statutes became "supplemental" to
the general maritime law. Thus, the Supreme Court allowed recovery for
a death on the high seas in The Hamilton9 and for death in territorial
waters in Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia."
Prior to most of these state wrongful death statutes there had been no
federal statutes covering wrongful death on navigable waters. So the
courts had to rely on the separate and distinct state laws to cover the area.
The federal courts in their eagerness to give some relief to an injured party
advanced several theories in behalf of their acceptance of the non-uniform
state laws as supplemental to admiralty law. There were three frequently
advanced reasons for acceptance of these state statutes: (1) that the use
of these distinct statutes would not produce "any lamentable lack of uni-
'Fla. Stat. Ann. #768.01 (1964).
' Florida has a procedural statute which allows the state Supreme Court to give
advice on questions of state law when requested to do so by federal appellate
courts. Fla. Stat. Ann. #25.031 (1961).
358 U.S. 588 (1959).
119 U.S. 199 (1886).
* Every state now has a wrongful-death statute.
'207 U.S. 398 (1907).
"1257 U.S. 233 (1921).
287
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formity,"" (2) that each injury would be "local in character,"'" and (3)
that -by using the various statutes, a void in the general maritime law
would be filled.'" A fourth possible reason for use of the state statutes was
advanced by Mr. Justice Harlan in Hess v. United States, 4 but little
acceptance of this reason was realized because of the short life it had until
Moragne. Supposedly these various reasons were to justify the state
statutes' supplemental use in general maritime law but because of the
various state interpretation of just what their death statutes would entail,
coverage became sporadic. Thus a need for a federal law became apparent.
The first federal statute covering the question of wrongful death in
admiralty was enacted in 1920, when The Death on the High Seas Act 5
was passed. This Act allowed a federal remedy for a wrongful death
occurring more than a maritime league from shore. In the same year, Con-
gress passed The Jones Act' 6 which gave seamen injured or killed upon
any navigable water, by negligence attributable to his employer, a cause
of action in admiralty. However, these statutes still left the question of a
remedy for a non-seaman killed in state territorial waters. Thus the non-
uniform state death acts still had to be applied to cover this situation and
their use generated even further confusion and litigation. A void still
existed where no federal statutory or judicial remedy was available.
Prior to these statutes the Supreme Court had decided a case which
seemingly fell into this area of confusion-Southern Pacific Co. v. Jen-
sen.'7 Here the court recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of the general
maritime law in personal injury cases, but the majority expressly reserved
the right to use state law in wrongful death cases. The Court asserted that
allowing state death statutes to "supplement" or "modify" the general
maritime law was permissible.' 8 Thus, Jensen held that the uniformity of
general maritime law was not to be disrupted.
" The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 406 (1907).
"= Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921).
" The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 592 (1959).
"361 U.S. 314, 330 (1960). Mr. Justice Harlan stated that "in permitting use
of (state) wrongful-death statutes admiralty is endeavoring to accommodate itself
to state policies represented by such statutes."
'"41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. ##761-768 (1970). The act specifically ex-
cluded tortious death within state territorial waters from coverage. It also excluded
several other areas from coverage but these are unimportant for discussion here.
"' 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. #688 (1970). This statute gives the personal
representative of the deceased seamen the right to maintain a wrongful-death and
survival action and extends coverage to the navigable waters of foreign countries
also.
"244 U.S. 205 (1917).
18 Id. at 216. A further in depth discussion of Jensen and the theories espoused
in it can be found at 72 Harvard Law Review 1363, 1364 (1959).
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However, Jensen seemed to cause more problems than it solved. The
question of the proper administration of state law within general maritime
laws obscured much of the rationale of Jensen. Much debate arose over
whether Jensen required the full effect of the state used death statute
with all its limitations or rights or whether Jensen merely allowed the use
of the remedy afforded by the state wrongful death statute.
In 1959, the Court had the opportunity to finally decide which theory
from Jensen would be the accepted one in admiralty. The Tungus v.
Skovgaard,'0 the court divided, affirmed the application and use of state
death statutes but proceeded on the first theory raised in Jensen. The
Court held here that if admiralty adopted a state statute as a rule of re-
covery, it must take the statute and remedy granted subject to all the
limitations "which have been made a part of its existence."2 The dissent
in a strong opinion agreed with using the state granted remedy but not
with any of the limitations imposed by the majority. They further said
that the state statute should merely be a vehicle for applying federal sub-
stantive law.2 But at least now with The Tungus some definitive approach
to the problem was advanced and judicially ruled on.
This problem solving case lasted one year until the court went back
to the confusion engendered by Jensen when it decided Hess v. United
States.2 2 The Court here veered slightly from its stand in The Tungus
and in doing so caused confusion anew. The Court in Hess adhered gen-
erally to The Tungus majority, but wavered in its stance and in doing
so caused much confusion, by saying that certain provisions of a state
death statute might be "so offensive to traditional principles of maritime
law" that admiralty should not and would not enforce them.2" And to
further compound the confusion raised by Hess, several lower courts be-
gan to interpret state wrongful death statutes as encompassing unsea-
worthiness, a traditional maritime and thus federal concept. 24 Conse-
quently, this problem supposedly settled in The Tungus was merely a
temporary stopgap to the confusion raised by Hess. And this stopgap ruling
" 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
20 Id. at 592.
2 Id. at 601-602. There was probably a fear of lack of uniformity in accepting
the state statute remedy limitations and all.
22 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
"' Id. at 320. However, to further add to the confusing problem, the Court on the
very same day went back to the rationale of The Tungus in deciding Goette v. Union
Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340 (1960).
24 Grigsby v. Coastal Marine Service of Texas, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 97 (W.D.
La. 1964), affirmed in part, 412 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1969); Vassallo v. Nederl-
Amerik Stoornv Maato Holland, 344 S.W.2d 421 (Texas 1961).
4
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was not finally solved until the court granted certiorari to Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, Inc.25
Here in Moragne the Court had the task of trying to resolve the
conflicts-of-law problems26 raised by the lower courts' rulings on state
death statutes. Intolerable injustices and inconsistencies had also occurred
post The Tungus because of the fortuity of where the decedent had been
killed.17 These pre-Moragne cases thus made it advantageous to go forum
shopping to get the best recovery. 8 In Moragne the Court thus had the
choice of either following the dissent in The Tungus, or of following a
completely new tact by pronouncing new law. And the latter was what
happened.
In a revolutionary decision the Court held that there was general
maritime law for wrongful death. But, even in this decision, the Court held
back from a total commitment to the new federal maritime law. Neither did
the Court denounce the persistent borrowing of state law to decide prob-
lems in this area, nor did the Court decide how the newly created federal
right was to be administered, leaving it rat-her to "further sifting through
the lower courts."2 9 And to further complicate the decision the Court also
held that an analogy to state law may be drawn since "The numerous state
wrongful-death acts have been implemented with success for decades."" °
Now the problem seems to be not so much whether recovery will be
granted for a wrongful death in state territorial waters but how will the
new judicially espoused law be administered. There seem to be three
possible solutions to this problem: (1) whether the court should continue
to use the full scope of state created rights, i.e., schedule of beneficiaries,
survival of claims for deceased's pain and suffering, a limit on recovery,
etc.; or (2) whether the court should be guided -by similar federal legis-
lation like The Jones Act and especially The Death on the High Seas
Act;1 or (3) whether the court should follow the more difficult, yet
" 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
" Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968) and Harris v.
United Air Lines Inc., 275 F. Supp. 431 (S.D. Iowa 1967), where the question of
which conflict of laws rule, i.e., the law of the state with the dominant interest in
the parties, should be applied. In Scott the "local" conflict of laws rule was applied
and in Harris the "situs" rule was used.
" Some states refused to consider a claim for unseaworthiness under their
wrongful-death statutes while other states had limits on recovery under their death
statutes. (Missouri, Illinois, and Massachusetts)
8 Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968).
" Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 408 (1970).80 Id. at 408.
81 The court recognized the remedy provided by The Death on the High Seas
Act but refused to adopt it as the proper measure of recovery. Smith v. Olsen and
Ugelstad, 324 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
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seemingly required, course of discerning from all relevant sources, both
state and federal, a whole new body of federal maritime law that would ex-
plain the question, "what is the proper measure of recovery?"8'
In Dennis v. Central Gulf Steamship Corporation,'3 the court first
came to grasp with these questions raised by the new Moragne maritime
law. Judge Rubin rejected solution number one, concluding that "The
newly recognized federal right has abandoned The Tungus as derelict. '3 4
The court did not even attempt to utilize solution number two as the
answer to recovery. It seems that the court applied the federal statutes,3 5
as well as relevant state law as the proper general maritime law to be
utilized. Judge Rubin also detects in Moragne a departure from The Tun-
gus by its repeated reference to The Tungus as borrowing of a state
'remedy,' rather than the enforcement of a state 'right.' The court also
with great insight went to the heart of the problem by declaring that:
... to take the view that Moragne added a federal right while leaving
the state remedy intact would provide some suitors with a choice of
remedies, but the confusion created by the existence of federal and state
remedies with differing rights, differing defenses, and differing lim-
itation periods, and potentially different beneficiaries would not be
abated .... 86
Thus the court was granting the right to a remedy under the new
maritime law, but still questioned the possible use of state law to provide
a choice of remedies. Judge Rubin states that "unless a single national rule
of damages is evolved, potential inequities, coupled with problems of fine
distinctions will persist. ' 37 The court then granted recovery for loss of
support, funeral expenses, loss of services, and decedent's damage but
denied recovery for survivor's grief only because of lack of proof. The
82 This solution is the probable answer and is implied in Moragne by the Court:
.In most respects the law applied in personal-injury cases will answer all
questions that arise in death cases. 398 U.S. at 406; and,
... If still other subsidiary issues should require resolution, such as particular
questions of the measure of damages, the courts will not be without per-
suasive analogy for guidance. Both the Death on The High Seas Act and the
numerous state wrongful-death acts have been implemented with success for
decades. 398 U.S. at 408.
These two statements certainly hint that the courts should fashion their own body
of federal maritime law for wrongful-death from analogous sources.
"8323 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. La. 1971).
84 Id. at 947.
8 The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. #688 (1970) and The Death on the High Seas
Act, 46 U.S.C. ##761-768 (1970).8 Dennis v. Central Gulf Steamship Corporation, 323 F. Supp. 943, 948 (E.D.
La. 1971).
8" Id. at 948.
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District Court, however, did not show whether this remedy was available
under the general maritime law or was taken from the available state law.
The Dennis case is the first case to go into the recovery that will be
granted by the new Moragie federal maritime law for wrongful death.
This is the first case to determine a measure of recovery completely under
the new maritime law without having to rely on the question of whether
a right will be granted by state law. But this case raises many more ques-
tions than it answers. Now the right to recover is granted by the general
maritime law but the question of the measure of recovery is still, it seems,
dependent on the various state laws in all their various interpretations.
This is the question Moragne left unsolved. By which standard do you
measure the amount of recovery-the various non-uniform state laws or
the federal laws on recovery?
Recently Senator Warren Magnuson attempted to amend The Death
on the High Seas Act by extending its coverage to not only include
navigable waters more than a maritime league from shore, but also to in-
clude state territorial waters."8 His bill was not enacted into law so this
void on the correct measure of recovery is still there. The simplest solu-
tion would be to have Congress enact a new statute covering this area of
questioning or at least (though not the best solution, in my opinion), ex-
tend The Death on the High Seas Act to cover state territorial waters.
Until Congress acts on this new problem, the courts should continue to
follow the lead of Moragne and grant recovery. After recovery is granted,
caution should be observed so that the open-ended decision of Moragne
does not once again lead to the confusion wrought by The Tungus and
Hess on the question of a measure of recovery. If caution is not observed,
further confusion and another intolerable lack of uniformity in the maritime
law will be created and we will once again have a problem similar to pre-
Moragne days.
RICHARD K. FOSTER
Mandatory Death: State v. Waddell
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently handed down a decision
reversing a judgment insofar as it imposed the death sentence upon a de-
fendant, James E. Waddell, convicted of rape.' However, this decision in
S. 3143, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
'State v. Waddell - N.C. -, - S.E.2d - (1973). This decision was filed
January 18, 1973, and at the time this paper was written the decision had not
been reported in advance sheet form.
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